This paper proposes a tractable analysis framework to evaluate the reliability, security and secrecy energy efficiency (SEE) performance in a UAV-enabled communication network via a threshold-based access scheme and multi-antenna technique. Specifically, the UAV-enabled transmitters, legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers are deployed randomly. To achieve reliable results for general communication scenarios, this paper assumes both line-of-sight and non-line-of-sight paths with Rayleigh fading for air-to-ground channel model. In particular, we first exploit the association probability of a randomly located receiver and the activation probability of UAV-enabled transmitters. Then, we analyze the security, reliability, and SEE of the UAV-enabled networks. Simulation results are finally provided to show the effect of the predetermined access threshold, the transmitter's resource block, the height of UAVs, the density of legitimate receivers, and the density of eavesdroppers on the reliability as well as security performance, and determine the optimal design parameters for a given UAV-enabled network to maximize the SEE.
I. INTRODUCTION
viable solution to combat against eavesdropping [13] . To improve the physical layer security of wireless transmissions, some related works were proposed by exploiting the multi-antenna techniques [14] - [16] and secrecy transmission schemes [17] , [18] . It was shown that the secrecy throughput significantly increases through the use of multi-antenna techniques or secrecy transmission schemes. However, the conventional secrecy transmission techniques, which is based on ground-to-ground channel, is not suitable for air-toground communication because of the different physical characteristics of wireless channel.
A very recent effort [19] considered physical layer security in a UAV-enabled mobile relaying system where the air-to-ground link was established. Note that the authors of [19] focused on the optimization of transmit power, but not from the perspective of network analysis and deployment. They considered neither the multi-UAV multi-eavesdropper wiretap scenario, nor the random spatial positions of network nodes. To the best of our knowledge, such work has not tried to design and analyze the secrecy energy efficiency (SEE) performance in UAV-enable communication networks, which motivates this work.
In this paper, we focus on the SEE in downlink UAV-enabled communication networks. Main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
1) We model multi-antenna UAV-enabled transmitters, receivers, and eavesdroppers as independent
homogeneous Poisson point processes (HPPPs) and model air-to-ground propagation channel including line-of-sight (LoS) and non-line-of-sight (NLoS) components;
2) By using the threshold-based access scheme, a fundamental analysis framework for evaluating the reliability, security and SEE performance in multi-antenna UAV-enabled communication networks is proposed;
3) The influences on connection outage probability (COP) and secrecy outage probability (SOP), caused by the predetermined access threshold, the height of UAV, the legitimate receivers' density, the eavesdroppers' density, and the number of receivers served by each transmitter, are further analyzed in this scenario. In addition, the optimal design parameters for a given UAV-enabled network to maximize the SEE are determined by the simulation results.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the channel model and secrecy mobile association scheme. Section III investigates the COP, SOP, and SEE, respectively. Sections IV presents the numerical results. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
Notations: Boldface lowercase letter denotes vector. (·) † , · , P{·}, and E(·) denote the conjugate transpose, Euclidean norm, probability, and expectation operation. Γ(a, b) is the Gamma distribution with shape parameter a and scale parameter b. 
II. SYSTEM MODEL

A. Network Descriptions
We consider a wireless system consisting of single-tier UAV-enabled transmitters, multiple legitimate receivers, and multiple eavesdroppers, as shown in Fig. 1 . Note that the UAVs are assumed to be at the same height H T for simplicity of exposition. Each UAV-enabled transmitter equipped with M T antennas can collect and transmit information to the ground receivers. The number of receivers served in each transmitter's resource block is Ψ T , and the transmit power is P T . The legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers are equipped with a single antenna. We denote the set of UAVs, legitimate receivers, and eavesdroppers locations as Φ T , Φ u , and Φ E , which follow independent HPPPs with densities λ T , λ u , and λ E , respectively. Its feasibility has been veried by both theoretical validation [20] and empirical evidence [21] . According to Slivnyak's theorem [22] , the analysis can be performed at a typical legitimate receiver located at the origin. Compared with interference, noise almost has no effect for legitimate receivers in random wireless networks [22] . Hence, we assume that the noises received by legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers are neglected.
One common approach to modeling air-to-ground propagation channel is to consider LoS and NLoS components along with their occurrence probabilities separately as shown in [9] . [10] only focused on the NLOS path with Rayleigh fading and [9] assumed that the impact of small-scale fading can be neglected.
Considering the free space propagation loss, different excessive path-loss values and small-scale fading are assigned to LoS and NLoS links with Rayleigh fading in this work. Depending on the LoS or NLoS connection between the legitimate/illegitimate receiver x and UAV y, the received signal power at x location is given by
where x − y is the distance between x and y, η is an additional attenuation factor due to the NLoS connection, h x,y is the array gain of channel between x and its corresponding UAV BS y, and α is the path loss exponent over the receiver-UAV link. Following the study of [9] , the probability of LoS connection depends on the environment, the location of the receiver x and the transmitter y, the elevation angle between x and y, and the density and height of buildings. The LoS probability can be expressed as follows
where C and B are constant values which depend on the environment and θ = 180 π sin(HT / x−y ) is the elevation angle. Furthermore, probability of NLoS is
In this work, the system model has other three restraints:
• All the channels undergo independent and identically distributed quasi-static Rayleigh fading [10] ;
• Perfect channel state information (CSI) is available at each UAV-enabled transmitter;
• All the transmitters use precoding w = h † / h , where h is the corresponding channel.
In UAV-enabled communication networks, the received signal-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of the typical receiver o served by the UAV-enabled transmitter x s ∈ Φ T is given by
where P o,xs h o,xs l −α o,xs denotes the received power of the typical receiver, l o,xs = H 2 T + r 2 o,xs denotes the distance between the serving transmitter x s and o, r o,xs denotes the distance between x s and o ′ (the origin of the plane of Φ T ), h o,xs ∼ Γ(∆ T , 1) stands for the array gain of the main channel, ∆ T = M T − Ψ T + 1, and l −α o,xs is the path loss [23] . T with density λ o T = P act λ T , where P act denotes the activation probability of transmitters. We consider the non-colluding and passive eavesdropping scenario that each eavesdropper intercepts the information signal of typical receiver independently without any attacks. In this case, we only pay our attention to the eavesdropper that has the largest received SINR, which was commonly assumed [23] .
Such an eavesdropper e is considered as the most malicious one and its received SINR can be expressed as SINR e = max xe∈ΦE P xe,xs h xe,xs l −α xe,xs
where h xe,xs ∼ exp(1) denotes the equivalent small-scale fading channel power gain for the received SINR of eavesdropper x e ∈ Φ E , l xe,xs = H 2 T + r 2 xe,xs indicates the distance between the eavesdropper x e and its target transmitter x s , and r xe,xs is the eavesdropper's horizontal distance from x s . I intra xe = P xe,xs g xe,xs l −α xe,xs with g xe,xs ∼ Γ (Ψ T − 1, 1) is the eavesdropper's received interference from the target transmitter (i.e., eavesdropper's intra-cell interference) and I inter xe = z∈Φ o T \xs P xe,z g xe,z l −α xe,z with g xe,z ∼ Γ (Ψ T , 1) is the eavesdropper's inter-cell interference [23] . l xe,z = H 2 T + r 2 xe,z is the distance between the eavesdropper x e and transmitter z, and r xe,z is the eavesdropper's horizontal distance from z.
B. Secrecy Mobile Association Scheme
In this subsection, we assume open access, i.e., a legitimate receiver is permitted to access any UAVenabled transmitters. In addition, we consider a mobile association based on highest average received signal power (ARSP), where a legitimate receiver is only allowed to associate with the UAV-enabled transmitter providing the highest ARSP. For a legitimate receivers o, the ARSP related to x s is defined
o,xs . Following the idea of [17] , the secure mobile association scheme is designed for improving the security/reliability of downlink transmission in UAV-enabled communication networks. For the secure mobile association scheme, the served transmitter broadcasts data only when the truncated ARSP at receiver is larger than a predetermined access threshold τ , i.e.,
where R T denotes the radius of the serving region. The following lemma provides the association probability.
Lemma 1: The probability with which a typical legitimate receiver o associates with a transmitter is given as
where
Proof : Please refer to Appendix A.
It is worth noting that a transmitter may be active when existing an associated receiver, and the activation probability of transmitter x s can be defined as [17] P act = P {x s associates with at least one receiver}
P{x u is not associated with x s } . From (3) and (4), we know that the derivation for activation probability of transmitter is necessary, which is given in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2: The activation probability of UAV-enabled transmitters is given by
Proof : Please refer to Appendix B.
III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the SEE in UAV-enabled communication networks. In an effort to assess the SEE, we first derive the COP and the SOP in UAV-enabled networks.
When the legitimate receiver's message cannot be decoded with error-free, the connection outage occurs. The expression of COP is given in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1:
The COP of typical receiver can be expressed as
where γ T is the target channel capacity. The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of SINR u can be given by
and
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As such, when the eavesdroppers have a better channel than the access threshold, the secrecy outage occurs to ensure the secrecy of those messages. As an important indicator of security, the expression of SOP is given in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. The SOP of typical receiver can be given by
whereR s is the target secrecy rate of P sop (R s ) and the CDF of SINR e can be expressed as
Proof : Please refer to Appendix D.
Due to the requirement of secure communication and the limitation of energy, SEE as an important
metric is used to evaluate the secrecy performance achieved with unit energy consumption. Similar to [24] , SEE is defined as the ratio of the average secrecy rate at which the confidential messages are reliably and securely transmitted from the UAV-enabled transmitters to the intended receivers over the total power consumption (bits/Joule). The following theorem provides the SEE achieved by the UAVenabled communication network.
Theorem 3. The SEE of the UAV-enabled communication networks is given by
where P total
) denotes the total power consumption for a UAVenabled transmitter in each channel [24] . P 0 T and ε T represent the static hardware power consumption and the efficiency of the power amplifier, respectively. The parameters∆ t and Λ t depends on the transceiver chains, coding and decoding, etc.
Proof : In existing literature, [18] investigated the SEE of single-antenna cognitive radio network (CRN) with secure mobile association scheme, and [24] invoked the SEE of multi-antenna CRN. Depending on the expression of SEE in [18] and [24] , the SEE in this work can be given as
where P tsop (γ T ,R s ) is the transmission secrecy outage probability (TSOP). The TSOP characterizes the probability that either connection outage or secrecy outage occurs [18] , which is derived as
Substituting (17) into (16), we can arrive at the final result.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, numerical results are provided to examine the COP and SOP for a single-tier UAVenabled network. In addition, the impact of τ and P T on the SEE are also investigated. The validity of the theoretical derivations are verified by the Monte Carlo simulation results. In the following results,
6, and η = 20dB. B = 0.136 and C = 11.95 are parameters for dense urban environment [9] . All the simulation results shown in this section are averaged over 100,000 Monte Carlo simulations. In this simulation setup, we set P T = 5dB, λ u = 10 −6 m −2 , λ E = 6 × 10 −6 m −2 , and H T = 500m.
Intuitively, the simulation results are highly consistent with the theoretical results, which validates the accuracy of those two analytical expressions derived. It is also observed that the COP increases with Ψ T and the SOP decreases with Ψ T , which is mainly due to the fact that Ψ T not only increases the interference received by eavesdroppers, but also increases the interference received by legitimate receivers.
Furthermore, the COP and SOP performances over different τ are also shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 .
Obviously, both SOP and COP degrade with increasing τ , which implies that the predetermined access threshold can affect both security and reliability. This is due to both the association probability in (6) and the activation probability of UAV-enabled transmitters in (8) degrades with increasing τ . Fig. 4 plots the COP of a receiver versus λ u /λ T for the different H T given in the figure. In this simulation setup, we set τ = −75dB, P T = 5dB, λ E = 6 × 10 −6 m −2 , ∆ T = 4, and Ψ T = 1. It is clear that the COP of a receiver ascends with λ u /λ T and descends with H T . This can be explained by the fact that both the increase in λ u /λ T and the decrease in H T improve the received interference of the receivers by increasing the number of active transmitters.
In Fig. 5 , the impacts caused by λ E /λ T and H T on the SOP of a receiver are evaluated. In this simulation setup, we set τ = −80dB, P T = 5dB, λ u = 2×10 −6 m −2 , ∆ T = 4, and Ψ T = 1. It is clear that the SOP of a receiver ascends with λ E /λ T . This is because the increase in λ E /λ T decreases the average distance between the most malicious eavesdropper and served transmitter. For extremely low density ratio λ E /λ T , the SOP of a receiver increases with H T . This is due to the effect of F SINRe 2 γT −Rs − 1 overtakes the effect of S T and F SINRe 2 γT −Rs − 1 decreases with H T . In the case of extremely high density ratio λ E /λ T , the SOP of a receiver decreases with H T . This can be explained by the fact that the effect of S T overtakes the effect of F SINRe 2 γT −Rs − 1 and S T decreases with H T .
For more comprehensive insight into the performance of a UAV-enabled network, the P act , S T , and SEE versus the predetermined access threshold τ and P T are evaluated and presented in Fig. 6, Fig. 7 , and ∆ T = 4, and Ψ T = 1. From Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 , we can see that both P act and S T decrease with τ and increase with P T . Obviously, both τ and P T affect R T , which directly affects the active transmitter and the associate probability of the typical receiver.
Next, Fig. 8 shows the influences on SEE caused by τ and P T . From (15), we note that the SEE is not a monotonous function of τ and P T . As a consequence, the optimal value of SEE can be obtained by properly designing τ and P T . In Fig. 3 , the SEE reveals a maximum value for a given network with the optimal pair of (τ, P T ) = (−95, 6), which is marked in the figure. 
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the SEE of downlink UAV-enabled networks, where the locations of network nodes were characterized by independent HPPPs. To ensure the reliability and security of UAV-enabled networks, both the threshold-based access scheme and multi-antenna technology were employed. The security, reliability, and SEE of UAV-enabled networks were analyzed. Simulation results have revealed that the reliability and security of UAV-enabled networks could be improved by using the threshold-based access scheme, and the optimal value of SEE could be achieved by designing the transmit power and predetermined access threshold. The association probability of a transmitter is given as
′ s ARSP at a receiver is greater than that of
where the step (a) can be easily recognized by the probability generating functional of HPPP Φ T [17] ,
, l o,xs is the receiver's distance from the nearest transmitter x s , and
Substituting (19) into (18), we can arrive at (20) as well as Lemma 1.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF LEMMA 2
The activation probability of UAV-enabled transmitter x B is given by
where the step (b) can be easily recognized by the probability generating functional of HPPP Φ u [17] , f lx u,xs (x) = 2πλ T xexp(−πλ T x 2 ), l xu,xs is the distance between x u the nearest transmitter x s , and P l xu,xs > (P xu,xs x α /P xu,xB )
Substituting (22) into (21), we can arrive at Lemma 2.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 1
When the typical receiver is associated with a UAV-enabled transmitter, its COP can be expressed as
In (23), the CDF of SINR u can be obtained as
is derived by using Faà di Bruno's lemma [17] andF ( 
where the step (c) is achieved by the probability generating functional of HPPP Φ o T [17] , and B 2 (a) = 1 − (1 + az −α ) −ΨT . Substituting (25) and (26) into (24), we can arrive at Theorem 1.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF THEOREM 2
When the typical receiver is associated with a UAV-enabled transmitter, its SOP can be given by
In (27), the CDF of SINR e can be derived as follows 
where the step (d) is achieved by the probability generating functiona of HPPP Φ E [17] , s ′ L = γP 
respectively. Substituting (29) and (30) into (28), we can arrive at Theorem 2.
